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This paper proposes to test the relationship between military expenditure and economic growth by including 
the impact of the share of military and civilian components of government expenditure in an economic 
growth model with endogenous technology. In this framework, we empirically consider the hypothesis of a 
nonlinear effect of military expenditure on economic growth. The comparison between costs and benefits of 
defence  sector  has  traditionally explained the nonlinear relationship. This paper suggests that shocks to 
insecurity may also be a source of nonlinearity as they determine a re-allocative effect within government 
expenditure. 
While parametric partial correlations are in line with empirical findings, the robustness of estimations is 
tested  by  using  a  nonparametric  approach.  The  negative  relationship  between  military  expenditure  and 
growth in countries with high levels of military burden predicted by theory becomes significant only after 
including a proxy for re-allocative effects in the growth equation.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The endogenuos growth theories suggest that government expenditure has an important 
impact  on  long  run  growth  rate.  Its  influence  depends  on  the  size  of  government 
intervention and on the different components of public spending. Moreover, different  kind 
of government expenditures have heterogeneous effects on economic growth. For example, 
public infrastructures, research and development and public education are often considered 
public goods which have a positive effect on economic growth (Ram, 1986; Aschauer, 
1989; Barro 1990, Morrison and Schwartz, 1996). On the other hand, observations that 
growth in government spending, mainly based on non-productive spending (Glomm and 
Ravikumar, 1997), is accompanied by a reduction in income growth has given rise to the 
hypothesis that the greater the size of government intervention the more negative is its 
impact on. However, while theory assigns productive government expenditure a key role in 
obtaining  a  higher  steady-state  growth  rate  of  the  economy,  empirical  findings  do  not 
generally support this link. Devarajan et al. (1996) modelling the relationship between 
different components of government expenditure conditioning with its initial shares find 
the  existence  of  a  positive  relationship  between  current  government  expenditure  and 
economic growth, while physical capital components of government expenditure highlight 
a negative impact.  
Governments  have  also  had  a  prominent  role  in  financing  the  military  sector.  The 
endogenous growth theory provides a foundation for the relationship between the share of 
military expenditure and long-run economic growth, predicting an inverse hump-shaped 
link (Shieh et al. 2002). The theoretical arguments stem from the comparison between the 
direct and indirect costs of military activities and its indirect benefits. When the share of 
military burden is small with respect to the whole economy, it is possible to have benefits 
greater than costs and to obtain a positive impact on growth rate (Deger and Sen, 1995). 
One  important  conclusion  is  that  neglecting  the  characteristics  of  nonlinearity  of 
military  expenditure  and  growth  results  in  mis-specified  models  which  bias  empirical 
analyses (Stroup and Heckelman, 2001; Cuaresma and Reitschuler, 2003; Aizenman and 
Glick 2006; Dunne and Perlo-Freeman, 2003; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). A common 
reason for the presence of nonlinearities is that military expenditure is the key to keep 
security, reflecting the hypothesis that the marginal effect of a change in military burden is 
not constant both across different levels of the variable and across economies and leading   3 
in  the  extreme  case  to  the  existence  of  multiple  growth  regimes  (Cuaresma  and 
Reitschuler, 2006). 
To  investigate  the  aforementioned  relationship,  we  model  military  spending  as  a 
separate issue in the production function with respect to other non-military government 
expenditures.  This  implies  that  government  decides  about  the  allocation  of  military 
expenditure in a complementary way to private inputs which are competitive with each 
other public service. In the empirical section, this framework enables us to test how the 
partial effect of military expenditure on growth can vary according to the different initial 
shares of government expenditure on non-military categories. In fact, while the effect of 
military expenditure is different whether the threat to security is high or low, economic 
insecurity might stimulate greater government efficiency. In fact, insecurity can lead the 
government to substitute inefficient spending with more efficient civilian outlays (Landau, 
1996; Stroup and Heckelman, 2001).  
This  article  discusses  empirical  issues  to  account  for  the  (nonlinear)  relationship 
between the share of military expenditure and growth by using Aizenman and Glick’s 
(AG)  data  (2006).  In  this  setting  we  extend  the  intertemporal-optimising  endogenous 
growth  model  proposed  by  AG.  In  their  framework  the  impact  of  military  burden  on 
growth  is  endogenously  determined  along  with  the  impact  of  external  threats.  The 
extension  we  propose  is  to  model  the  allocative  influence  of  civilian  and  military 
government expenditure on economic growth, so that a positive correlation between the 
size of military expenditure and the “efficiency” of civilian expenditure is expected in the 
military burden and economic growth nexus. To take this effect into account we introduce 
an interaction term which acts as a conditioning variable into the growth equation and in 
cross-country  analyses  its  effect  may  mitigate  the  original  negative  relationship. 
Furthermore, we test the role played by other forms of nonlinearities by considering that 
the  partial  effect  of  military  burden  varies  over  different  levels  of  the  variable  itself 
(Landau, 1996; Stroup and Heckelman, 2001). The empirical analysis is carried out by 
including  the  military  burden  squared  in  alternative  growth  regressions.  Moreover,  the 
presence of multiple growth regimes is assessed by grouping (dividing into subgroups) 
countries  according  to  their  military  burden.  In  the  latter  case,  country  spillovers  that 
generate  a  safe  environment  for  domestic  and  foreign private investments and indirect 
benefit on growth might determine multiple steady-states in presence of an increase in the   4 
demand for military expenditure. Finally, in a complementary way, the robustness of the 
partial linear regressions between military burden and growth is evaluated by using a non-




Ideally, our hypothesis regarding the effects of military expenditure on growth should be 
incorporated  into  a  general  growth  model.  Even  though  there  are  a  large  numbers  of 
contributions of theory concerning the effects of government expenditure components on 
economic  growth,  the  empirical  evidence  is  mixed.  It  is  difficult  therefore  to  classify 
government expenditures in productive or unproductive categories. Their impact on growth 
is left to empirical results. 
We  consider  a  growth  model  with  endogenous  technology  in  which  the  impact  of 
military expenditure on economic performance does not depend on the choice of supply-
side  or  demand-side  models  (Sandler  and  Hartley,  1995).  The  framework  uses  a 
representative  household  that  consumes,  accumulates  and  pays  taxes  with  respect  to  a 
single composite commodity. The government provides security by spending on defense 
and provides public services by investing in consumption and infrastructures (Barro, 1990; 
Devarajan et al., 1996).  
Formally, the aggregate production function is assumed to include private capital stock, 
k, military government expenditure, 1 g , and non-military government expenditure,  2 g . The 
production function is Cobb-Douglas, therefore the relationship can be written as: 
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As a result of (1) the household’s budget constraint is given by the motion equation of 
private capital, taking the government’s decisions about expenditure allocation as given: 
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where 
.
k  denotes the private capital changes with respect to time, t  is the flat rate income 
tax and  c is the consumption level of households. Thus, the representative agent chooses 
consumption, c, and capital, k , in order to maximize the future instantaneous utilities: 
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where  r  is the rate of time preference. We assume that this function increases in c and is 
concave; therefore we have that   0 ) ( > ¶ c  and  0 ) (
2 < ¶ c . As usual in this literature, we use 












c u                   (4) 
 
in  which  s   is  the  intertemporal  elasticity  of  substitution  of  consumption.  Since  the 
elasticity of substitution is assumed to be positive, it is worth noting that the marginal 
utility of consumption  s -   must be negative. 
By  using  the  flat-rate  income  tax,t ,  the  government  finances  public  expenditure 
dividing  them  between  military  and  non-military  outlays.  Thus,  the  following  budget 
constraint relationship is given:  
 
y g g G t = + = 2 1                   (5) 
 
Let  f  and  f - 1  be respectively the fraction of resources for military and non-military 
spending. The flows of government spending are allocated by using the following rules: 
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In order to obtain a growth rate of consumption, the model for the representative household 
is solved by putting (4) into (3) and maximizing subject to (1), (2), (5), (5a) and (5b). 
However, it is well known from Barro’s work (1990) that given the utility function (4), the   6 








,  so  that  the  steady-state  growth  rate  of 
consumption can be written as: 
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The formulation of the model is a way to assert something about the role of the public 
sector,  namely  the  military  and  non-military  sector,  on  the  growth  rate  by  using  the 
comparative statistic.  To this purpose, we formulate equation (6) in terms of the parameter 
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Then, we insert (7) into equation (6) and, differentiating it with respect to f , we obtain the 
following result: 
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By  partially  differentiating  with  respect  to  the  share  of  military  government 
expenditure, we are now able to impose some restrictions on the expected sign of that 
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It is worth noting that the impact of the military burden on growth depends on the 
productivity parameters relative to their initial share,  f . Thus, if the actual f  is higher 
than its optimal level with respect to the relative output elasticity, a  and  b  , we expect 
military burden to have a negative impact on growth, as generally predicted in models with 
endogenous technology.  
If  we  concentrate  our  attention  on  high  levels  of  military  expenditure,  where 
opportunity costs dominate indirect benefits from military expenditure, there is another 
channel which may generate nonlinearities. External shocks in threat produce increases in 
military expenditure’s share. This might bring about reallocative effects in response to 
economic uncertainty: diversion of expenditure toward more efficient civilian activities 
may be a source of nonlinearity in the growth process. It is worth remarking that the 
efficiency of government policies does not imply that the share of civilian government 
expenditure decrease when military expenditure rise, since efficiency might be obtained by 
more productive re-allocative effects (Landau, 1996). Thus, the steady-state growth rate 
based on equations (9) may be positively affected by government expenditure reallocation 
and it is possible to find a less negative impact of the military expenditure on growth.  
In the next section we empirically investigate the impact of military expenditure on 
economic performance and we analyze how the composition of government expenditure 
and its financing affect the steady-state growth rate. We take into account the nonlinear 
relationship  between  military  expenditure  and  growth  as  well  as  countries’  specificity 
which make the steady state growth rate conditional.  
 
 
3. THE EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK 
The theoretical link developed enables to test whether the share of military expenditure 
and its initial share are associated with higher (or lower) growth. As previously mentioned, 
the  aim  of  the  paper  is  far  from  evaluating  the  impact  of  specific  threats  on  military 
burden.  However,  the  need  for  security  is  a  possible  source  of  nonlinearities  in  the 
relationship between military burden and economic growth (Hooker and Knetter, 1997; 
Aizenman and Glick, 2006; Crespo Cuaresma and Reitschuler, 2004)
1. Empirical models 
for  military  expenditure  demand  have  generally  been  specified as a function of socio-
economic, institutional factors and threats to security. Both internal and external threats   8 
have been found having a positive statistical relationship with military expenditure (Dunne 
and Perlo-Freeman, 2003). Thus, as the theory suggests, a shock to security cause the 
initial share of military expenditure to rise and, at the same time, it leads to modify the 
composition of non-military expenditure in the production function. We refer to the latter 
effect as the re-allocative effect of civilian government expenditure. Landau (1996) finds 
evidence  that  the  hypothesized  reallocation  regenerate  more  efficient  government 
expenditure. In a sample of developing countries he found that higher share of military 
expenditure is not associated with lower shares of productive government expenditures 
such as education, health and infrastructures. Stroup and Heckelman’s (2001) empirical 
results  also  confirm  the  same  effect.  Referring  to  a  cross-section  of  Africa  and  Latin 
America countries they show that an increase of military expenditure, caused by external 
threat, is associated to higher current government expenditure, which has a positive impact 
on economic growth. These results can be rationalized saying that nonlinear behaviour of 
military burden-growth nexus induces policy-makers to obtain more efficient government 
policies, especially in developing countries. More precisely, the behavioral hypothesis is 
that when the inhabitants’ perception of an external threat increases, it is likely that policy-
makers can draw more taxes and allocate the additional income part to the defense sector 
and part to more efficient public policies. This does not mean that the efficiency f their 
economic  frontiers  can  be  obtained  simply  by  substituting  unproductive  government 
expenditure  with  productive  activities
2.  This  is  because  the  productivity  of  each 
expenditure category depends on its initial share to GDP and the complementarity among 
inputs (Devarajan et al., 1996). 
To sum up, our key explanatory variables of the growth equation are the shares of 
military and non-military government expenditure, which we assume to have a negative 
sign  in  the  empirical  estimates.  However,  we  include  a  variable  to  account  for  the 
interaction between military burden and the share of non-military expenditure (govms). 
This term is considered responsible for the nonlinearity effects. Its impact on growth is 
expected  to  be  positive  and  therefore  it  will  mitigate  the  negative  impact  of  military 
expenditure on growth in the main equation. 
The  robustness  of  model  is  investigated  by  takings  into  account  that  the  share  of 
military expenditure might vary over different levels of the variable itself. To account for 
this fact, the squared value of military expenditure is introduced into the equation as an   9 
alternative  proxy  for  govms  (Landau,  1996).  To  support  the  basic  nonlinear  effect  of 
military  expenditure  on  economic  growth  we  should  expect  a  positive  and  significant 
coefficient  for  the  military  burden  and  a  negative  and  significant  coefficient  for  the 
military burden squared (Stroup and Heckelman, 2001). 
However, the hypothesis that nonlinearities may be generated by high levels of both 
military and non-military expenditure for different groups of countries represents one of 
the aims of this paper. In fact, the threshold at which these nonlinearities occur is largely 
variable and depends on the country specific perception about uncertainty. Thus, if the 
nonlinearities are not statistically controlled for, the negative relationship between military 
burden and growth might be questionable as the relationship might be locally misspecified. 
We propose that a nonparametric approach can check the robustness of the parametric 
estimations of the model, which can either include or not include the interaction variable, 
govms. The strategy of the analysis is carried out by following the parametric estimations 
produced by AG (2006) and by replacing the discrete variable of threat with govms
3. The 
framework is given by: 
 
h h h h h h X z K e b b b b g + + + + = 4 3 2 1             (10) 
 
where K is a vector of state variables,  z is a vector of country’s environmental variables, X 
represents the set of the shares of military and non-military expenditure with respect to 
GDP and the interaction term. Thus, { } , , X mil gov govms = . 
Considering the partially linear regression representing the growth equation in (10), the 










h a  and 
T
h l are transposed vectors of unknown parameters. The core function 
) (X h f can be specified as a univariate function such as  ) (x h f or as a multivariate function 
) (x h f  in which the conditioning variables of interest are included. The underlying model is the 
one specified in (10), in which X may or may not contain the interaction term as explanatory   10 
variable. Let for convenience consider the model in which the interest variable is  { } mil X = . 
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The aim is to estimate 
T
h a  and 
T
h l  in presence of the unknown function  h f , with the 
objective of estimating  mil h = f , after checking for the effects of non-military government 
expenditure  of  the  state  and  environmental  variables.  The  procedure  is  repeated  by 
including govms variable to account for nonlinearity in the growth-military burden nexus. 
The estimations rely on a simple basic idea. If  h f  is linear, the local conditional correlation 
is calculated as a partial residual from the regression  h g that contains all variables except 
military burden. Then, following Robinson (1988), a kernel based estimation is used to 
obtain  the  unknown  function.  The  inspection  of  nonparametric  estimations  helps  to 
understand  whether  the  interaction  term  in  the  growth  equation  robustly  accounts  for 
nonlinearities.  To  this  purpose,  two  procedures  are  possible:  one  can  test  alternative 
hypotheses in a nested framework and/or one can use a nonparametric measure of model 
(11) as a benchmark for the evaluation of parametric results. In order to stress this point, 
the inverse U-shaped relationship between military burden and growth (which scholars 
have found when controls for nonlinearities are omitted) might suggest the existence of an 
unknown  level-dependent  relationship.  We  follow  Hansen’s  (2000)  procedure  to 
endogenously determine the possible threshold of military burden, applied in the defense 





Table 1 shows the regression results of the cross-section estimations for the set of countries 
selected by AG (2006). Firstly, we discuss the estimations based on the full sample of 90 
countries in column 1 and 2. The difference between the specifications of column 1, 2a and 
2b concerns the selected choice variable. In the first column, govms is included together 
with military burden (mil), while the second column (2a) outlines a restricted model the 
govms variable excluded. Column 2b shows the growth equation results by including the 
squared of military expenditure (milsq). 
The parsimonious growth models include non-military expenditure with respect to GDP 
(gov), the logarithm of the initial GDP (lgdp) and the share of private investments over   11 
GDP (inv_gdp) as state variables: these variables reflect each country’s endowments of 
physical  capital  and  natural  resources
4.  The  environmental  variables  embodied  are 
measured  by  the  population  growth  rate  (gpop)  and  a  dummy  variable  for  African 
countries (Africa). According to AG (2006), the measure of good government (goodgov) 
was  directly  included  in  the  model  since  it  was  found  to  significantly  condition  the 
allocation of government expenditure (Mauro, 1995, 2001). 
The parameter of (the logarithm of) initial GDP is interpreted as the conditional rate of 
convergence
5. The model in column 1 produces a greater convergence with respect to the 
restricted model in column 2 (about 2 percent against 1.6). This value is in line with many 
empirical  work  in  growth  economics  (see  Barro,  Sala-I-Martin,  2005)  and  as  well  in 
defence economics. In accordance with AG’s (2006) results, we found that military burden 
has a direct and significant effect on growth only in the case when govms is included in the 
specification. Instead, supporting the finding by Barro (1991) and Knight et al. (1996), the 
restricted model (column 2a) shows an insignificant effect of military burden on growth. 
These outcomes assume relevance in explaining Landau’s hypothesis. Since the interaction 
term govms has as expected a positive sign and it is statistically significant, shocks on 
threat to security causes a higher level of government expenditure in military and non-
military categories. The expenditure impact on growth of the share of civilian government 
expenditure is expected to be negative and represents the potential for governments to use 
resources for enacting economically unproductive public sector policies. Finally, all the 
other  control  variables  included  in  the  models  have  the  expected  signs  and  they  are 
statistically significant at the usual level.  
Diagnostic tests are reported at the bottom of Table 1 in which the heteroskedasticity 
test is separated from skewness and kurtosis. It is worth noting that the extended growth-
military model in column 1, which accounts for heteroschedasticty, rejects the hypothesis 
at the five percent conventional level. Keeping in mind that the aforementioned hypothesis 
generally represents a relevant issue in cross-country estimations, by including govms we 
obtain an improvement in the statistical model
6. 
As shown by including govms in the relationship between military burden and growth, it 
is likely that a large share of the non-linearities is accounted for. The model in column 2b 
is estimated by substituting govms in model 1 by milsq. The results show insignificant   12 
coefficients for mil and milsq rejecting the presence of this form of nonlinearities. For this 
reason the rest of the paper will focus on the comparison between model 1 and model 2a.  
 On the other hand, it has to be taken into account that the size, sign and significance of 
4 b  in equation (10) could depend on state (K ) and environmental (z) variables, so that 
correlations can hide part of the nonlinearities in the data. To investigate this problem, we 
analyse  the  robustness  of  the  previous  results  by  a  nonparametric  estimation.  This 
approach potentially allows to consider a great amount of variability, so that the robustness 
is  evaluated  by  comparing  local  nonparametric  partial  correlations  between  military 
expenditure  and  growth  with  their  parametric  counterpart.  In  Figure  1,  the  solid  lines 
outline the partial relation between growth and military burden, as implied by the linear 
regression in column 1 and 2a of Table 1. The horizontal axis plots mil for the full sample, 
while the vertical axis shows growth rate  h g  after filtering the conditional variables of the 
model other than mil. For the same variables, the dash lines report the non parametric 
conditional correlation. Their estimations are obtained by running locally weighted least 
square  regressions  and  using  different  bandwidths.  Starting  from  .8,  the  bandwidth  is 
reduced  to  .2  to  allow  for  decreasing  (amounts  of)  smoothing.  Since  we  find  the 
nonparametric  relationship  to  be  stable  between  military  burden  and  growth  in  the 
neighbourhood of .5, our graphs only report the patterns for this estimation bandwidth.  
The assumption that govms account for nonlinearities is confirmed by the graphs in 
Figure 1.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 
 
The nonparametric partial correlation in Figure 1(graph a) shows a slight downward 
sloping  and  a  little  curvature  extremely  close  to  the  parametric  correlation  when  the 
control for the interaction term is included. The negative impact of military burden on 
growth is coherent both with the theoretical view and with recent empirical estimations 
(Stroup  and  Heckelman,  2001;  Cuaresma  and  Reitschuler,  2003;  Aizenman  and  Glick, 
2006).  
The  estimation  of  the  nonparametric  pattern  shows  that  nonlinear  effects  in  the 
relationship between military burden and growth often occur in those countries with high 
military  burden.  While  Israel  and  Jordan  seem  to  have  a  leverage  effect  in  the  linear   13 
parametric  regression,  if  we  do  not  include  a  “correct”  control  for  the  presence  of 
nonlinearities,  we  can  suppose  that  the  highest  military  burden  levels  could  determine 
changes in the regime of their relationship with economic growth
7. It is easy to verify that 
countries with a high level of military burden also allocate more of their budget to non-
military government functional category. This explains why the interaction variable aims 
to  explain  the  positive  substitution  effect  between  inefficient  and  efficient  civilian 
government expenditure. The results show a negative relationship between military burden 
and  economic  growth.  Furthermore,  Figure  1  (graph  b)  shows  that  the  relationship 
becomes insignificant as govms is omitted, which confirms the previous results  
A further hypothesis is put forward for a sub-sample of countries. Since the interaction 
between military burden and government expenditure produces a different threshold which 
might reverse the military burden-growth relationship, we can have nonlinearity across-
country with more than one change of slope.  
Before testing the aforementioned hypotheses, the endogenous threshold is estimated to 
obtain countries’ sub-samples in which the positive relationship between military burden 
and  growth  may  become  negative  as  the  military  burden  increases  from  positive  to 
negative as the military burden become higher. We adapt Hansen’s procedure for cross-
country  estimations,  in  which  data  are  sorted  by  the  empirical  distribution  of  military 
burden. The threshold is estimated by dividing the original sample into two sub-samples, 
i.e. only one change of regime in the military burden-growth nexus.  
The estimated parameters for these two sub-samples are obtained through equation (10). 
Since  the  variable  responsible  for  the  regime  switching  is  unobservable,  we  include  a 
dummy variable to account for different regimes. The threshold’s estimate is obtained by 
considering each realization of the unobservable variable, starting from 30 percent of the 
empirical distribution. The estimated parameter is the result of minimizing the sum of 
squared residuals across all estimated models. The sample is divided into two groups: one 
includes 39 countries with a lower military burden, while the second group includes 50 
countries with a share of military expenditure over the threshold.  
The estimates of the growth regressions for each of the two sub-samples are presented 
in columns (3-4) and (5-6) of Table 1. Columns (4) and (6) show the regressions without 
controls for nonlinearities, while columns (3) and (5) include the control variables. It is 
worth noting that military burden has a negative impact on growth in countries with high   14 
levels of military burden. Instead, contrary to the expectations, in countries with a lower 
military burden the estimates are positive but not significant, even when the regression is 
controlled for govms. Only in countries with higher military burden the interaction term 
positive and statistically significant at the ten percent level, which supports the previous 
results. The conclusion is that the synergy between high levels of non-military and military 
expenditures  tends  to  diminish  the  negative  influence  that  a  given  share  of  military 
expenditure  determines  on  economic  growth.  It  should  be  noted  that  diagnostic  tests, 
reported in Table 1, confirm a good fit for the estimated regressions. Finally, Figures 2 and 
3 display parametric and nonparametric correlations between military burden and growth, 
in a restricted sample of countries with lower and higher military burden, respectively.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 AND FIGURE 3 
 
In Figure 2, low military burden countries have an almost horizontal growth-military 
burden curve when govms is excluded, indicating that military burden is fairly constant 
across growth rates. The nonparametric estimation does not add relevant aspects also when 
the interaction term is included in the estimations; the estimated patterns are close to the 
parametric  ones.  The  graph  in  Figure  3  (graph  b)  points  out  an  interesting  feature:  in 
countries with very high level of defense expenditure we observe a nonlinear relation with 
a negative to positive slope change. Thus, even if we do not provide a formal test to 
disentangle nonlinearities, the inclusion of the interaction term allows to account for the 
local (and global) robustness of the relationship between military expenditure and growth. 
 
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS  
This  paper  discuss  whether  the  growth  regression  method,  derived  by  the  endogenous 
growth model, is appropriated to measure the relationship between military burden and 
economic growth. Since the share of government spending is believed to explain lower 
growth  rates,  we  model  the  steady-state  growth  rate  by  including  the  initial  shares  of 
civilian and military components. Moreover, this model enables to include the possible 
presence of nonlinearities in the previous relationship.   15 
Our empirical tests extend the analysis carried out by Aizenman and Glick (2006). We 
substitute the nonlinear impact of the external threat by an interaction term to account for 
the  re-allocative  influence  of  government  expenditure  between  civilian  and  military 
components. The hypothesis behind this choice is that the share of military expenditure, 
which  incorporates  external  shocks  to  countries’  security,  may  generate  significant  re-
allocative effects in government expenditure efficiency. 
Our  parametric  results  are  in  line  with  previous  empirical  findings  concerning  the 
relationship between the share of military expenditure and economic growth. In contrast, 
we find an insignificant impact on growth for the square of military expenditure when this 
variable is used as a proxy for alternative forms of nonlinear relationship.  
The robustness of estimations is tested by a nonparametric approach applied to two sub-
samples: a group with high military spending level and a second group with low military 
spending. For the first group we find a weak negative relationship between the share of 
military  expenditure  and  economic  growth  when  the  reallocative  term  is  excluded;  a 
regime  change  occurs  in  the  last  part  of  this  sub-sample.  However,  the  negative 
relationship  becomes  significant  only  if  the  interaction  term  is  included:  this  variable 
mitigates the negative impact of a given military burden on economic growth. By contrast, 
countries with lower military burden show an insignificant relationship between military 
burden and growth with the nonparametric estimations close to the parametric analysis.  
In conclusion, the results confirm that the relationship between military expenditure and 
growth might contain nonlinearities other than those hypothesized by traditional growth 
models in which the appropriate control variables are not included. In this direction, the 
nonparametric approach seems to be a useful tool for future research to avoid functional 
misspecifications in the growth equation. 
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Table 1 – Estimations results of the cross-country military expenditure-growth model for 
the full sample and sub-sample countries with high and low military expenditure based on 
the endogenous threshold 
 
  Full Sample  High military exp.  Low military exp. 
Variables  (1)  (2a)  (2b)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
               
lgdp  -1.952  -1.626  -1.651  -1.126  -1.131  -2.847  -2.831 
  (0.000)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.128)  (0.137)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
mil  -0.880  0.024  -0.159  -1.135  -0.431  0.985  0.046 
  (0.010)  (0.873)  (0.719)  (0.016)  (0.057)  (0.624)  (0.943) 
govms  0.072      0.056    -0.061   
  (0.004)      (0.082)    (0.621)   
milsq      0.021         
      (0.664)         
goodgov  0.441  0.416  0.416  0.952  1.035  0.585  0.571 
  (0.023)  (0.041)  (0.041)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.052)  (0.051) 
gov  -0.329  -0.117  -0.124  -0.419  -0.204  -0.175  -0.258 
  (0.001)  (0.083)  (0.076)  (0.009)  (0.038)  0.357  0.006 
inv_gdp  0.115  0.088  0.092  0.102  0.092  -0.002  0.004 
  (0.026)  (0.100)  (0.091)  (0.074)  (0.114)  (0.989)  (0.969) 
gpop  -1.335  -1.013  -1.076  0.421  0.722  -2.753  -2.739 
  (0.001)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.485)  (0.229)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
africa  -2.495  -2.645  -2.541  -3.061  -3.341  -2.811  -2.770 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.009)  (0.009) 
constant  20.651  15.203  15.813  10.498  6.978  29.192  30.303 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.071)  (0.206)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
                       
Diagnostics               
R
2  0.443  0.372  0.373  0.588  0.551  0.617  0.613 




42 c =57.7 
2
34 c =60.4 
2
34 c =59.8 
2
42 c =44.8 
2
34 c =39.9 
2
34 c =35.0 
2
33 c =34.0 
  (0.053)  (0.003)  (0.013)  (0.354)  (0.221)  (0.420)  (0.419) 
Skewness  
2
8 c =17.45 
2
7 c =10.51 
2
7 c =12.62 
2
8 c =10.2 
2
7 c =11.05 
2
8 c =10.47 
2
7 c =11.80  
  (0.025)  (0.161)  (0.115)  (0.247)  (0.136)  (0.233)  (0.107) 
Kurtosis 
2
1 c =3.41 
2
1 c =2.51 
2
1 c =2.56 
2
1 c =1.71 
2
1 c =2.64 
2
1 c =1.10  
2
1 c  =1.42  
  (0.064)  (0.112)  (0.107)  (0.19)  (0.103)  (0.293)  (0.232) 
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Figure 1 – Partial correlation and non-parametric estimations between military expenditure and 
growth rate (full sample) 
 
      a) Estimations with the proxy of security       b) Estimations without the proxy of security 
           
 
Figure 2 - Partial correlation and non-parametric estimations between the sub-sample of countries 
with a lower military expenditure and the growth rate 
 
      a) Estimations with the security proxy       b) Estimations without the security proxy 
            
 
Figure 3 - Partial correlation and non-parametric estimations between the sub-sample of countries 
with a higher military expenditure and the growth rate 
 
      a) Estimations with the security proxy       b) Estimations without the security proxy 
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FOOTNOTES 
                                                 
1 The endogenous growth framework that includes military expenditure as an imperfect substitute 
for private capital and external threat is used in Aizenman and Glick (2006). 
2 This point of view is sustained by Landau (1994) and Stroup (2001).  
3 The slight coherence of the categorical indicator of external threat of a country in the theoretical 
framework used in Aizenman and Glick (2006) and the statistical inconsistence of this variable 
obtained in estimations makes the use of this indicator to account for nonlinearities questionable. 
4 The measures of human capital in the form of schooling were found to be statistically non-
significant and were omitted. 
5 It is known that the economy tends to approach its long-run steady state at the estimated rate if the 
other explanatory variables of the growth model are held constant. 
6  Fiaschi  and  Lavezzi  (2006)  discuss  these  aspects  showing  the  negative  relationship  between 
volatility and growth. 
7 For example, in the growth model context, a nonparametric test of multimodality was used by 
Bianchi (1997) to test the hypothesis of income convergence for a group of 119 countries between 
1970 and 1989.  